Analysis and Diversion of Duqu's Driver by Bonfante, Guillaume et al.
Analysis and Diversion of Duqu’s Driver
Guillaume Bonfante
Université de Lorraine
LORIA
Jean-Yves Marion
Université de Lorraine
LORIA
Fabrice Sabatier
Inria
LORIA
Aurélien Thierry
Inria
LORIA
E-mail: firstname.lastname@loria.fr
Abstract
The propagation techniques and the payload of Duqu
have been closely studied over the past year and it
has been said that Duqu shared functionalities with
Stuxnet. We focused on the driver used by Duqu dur-
ing the infection, our contribution consists in reverse-
engineering the driver: we rebuilt its source code and
analyzed the mechanisms it uses to execute the payload
while avoiding detection. Then we diverted the driver
into a defensive version capable of detecting injections
in Windows binaries, thus preventing further attacks.
We specifically show how Duqu’s modified driver would
have detected Duqu.
1 Introduction
When it was first discovered in September 2011 by
CrySys [4], it was said that Duqu was close to Stuxnet
in that they shared infection and propagation mech-
anisms. Duqu is an offensive tool used to steal infor-
mation: Symantec [7] identified, amongst other pay-
loads, keyloggers, screen recorders, network monitors
and service discovery tools. It is kept up to date by
Command & Control servers and bundled with an auto-
destruction feature typically triggered 36 days after the
infection.
The attacks seem to have been successful since the
malware was not detected during the operations (some
of them lasted a few month) but only post-mortem.
Besides, according to Kasperky [5], the latest version
of Duqu was found in February 2012, long after the mal-
ware was first discovered and documented. Thus Duqu
is a stealthy spyware and the attacks were carefully
adapted to each target.
At the High Sec Lab, we develop a malware detec-
tor based on morphological analysis [3], which is a tech-
nique based on control flow graph comparison. As soon
as we put our hands on Stuxnet and Duqu samples,
we wanted to know if our approach, knowing Stuxnet,
could lead to the detection of Duqu. In fact the answer
is yes but : we recognize Duqu’s main DLL as related
to Stuxnet but only if it is decrypted. The aim of
this paper is to present an automatic extraction proce-
dure to bypass stealth techniques such as those used by
Duqu. The irony of this work is that Duqu itself served
for this purpose. Let us describe in broad terms our
contribution.
Infection timeline. The infection detected by
CrySys used a malicious Microsoft Word document em-
bedding Duqu. Firstly it exploits a 0-day kernel vulner-
ability (on TrueType fonts [1]), it installs three com-
ponents: a driver (nfrd965.sys), an encrypted DLL
(Duqu’s main DLL, NETP191.PNF) and an encrypted
configuration file (netp192.PNF).
The second step takes place at the next reboot. The
driver monitors processes loaded by the OS and injects
Duqu’s DLL into a process specified by the configura-
tion file, typically services.exe.
During the third and final step, the payload, which
is included in the DLL, is activated.
Detecting this malware is challenging because only
the driver is unencrypted on the hard drive. The DLL
is encrypted, packed with UPX, and is injected imme-
diately after decryption so it is only stored decrypted
in RAM. Thus detection could take place when the in-
jection is done, which is right after the decryption of
the DLL and before it is activated.
Once installed on a first target, Duqu receives orders
for further attacks and propagation from Command
& Control servers. Each new controlled machine can
be configured to connect back to the attacker through
some routing tunnel, providing access to restricted ar-
eas.
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Defensive version. The defense scenario will be the
following. We modify Duqu’s driver so it monitors
loaded processes, stores hashes of their code and de-
tects when an alteration is done.
We began by rebuilding a consistent source code for
the driver from the binary, then performed an in-depth
analysis of the infection method. Finally we modified
the code to build a defensive version capable of moni-
toring loaded processes and detecting an infection.
2 Rebuilding the driver’s source code
We knew Duqu shared code with Stuxnet since we
showed equivalent parts in the drivers’ main DLLs
[9] and Symantec revealed similarities in the injection
technique and some resources. The decompilation of
Stuxnet’s driver had already be done by Amr Tha-
bet [8] but we decided to decompile Duqu’s driver into
C code to expose how it operates and the difference
between the drivers of Duqu and Stuxnet. And ac-
tually we found singular techniques for injection and
anti-detection mechanisms.
2.1 IDA’s decompiler
We used IDA’s plugin "Hex-Rays Decompiler" [2].
It generates C pseudocode from a binary being ana-
lyzed in IDA and authorizes modifications of the C code
from within the plugin’s GUI. Unfortunately the code
generated by IDA was, in our case, not directly usable:
an example of the first lines of a function decompiled by
IDA is given on Figure 1. Firstly the code cannot be re-
compiled because some variable types, function argu-
ments and calling conventions were not recognized by
the decompiler. Secondly the generated code is hardly
readable, partly because some structures and librairies
were not identified. Let us detail how to circumvent
these issues.
In order to rebuild a consistent source code we
followed an incremental protocol based on the de-
compiler’s output. We began with commenting the
whole decompiled code except for the entrypoint of the
driver. We fixed compilation errors and identified miss-
ing structures. Once the entrypoint was readable and
could be compiled, we added some more code that was
previously commented, fixed it, and so on.
2.2 Structures and types identification
Figure 1 depicts the first lines of the decompiler’s
output for one of the driver’s function. A lot of in-
formation is missing, for instance most types are de-
scribed as int so the kind of processing done is un-
signed int __cdecl sub_12F36 ( int a1 ,
int a2 , int a3 )
{
int v4 ; // eax@3
unsigned __int16 v5 ; // cx@4
int v6 ; // ecx@7
v4 = a2 + ∗(_DWORD ∗ ) ( a2 + 60 ) ;
i f (∗ (_DWORD ∗) v4 ^ 0xF750F284
!= 0xF750B7D4)
return 1 ;
Figure 1. First 10 lines of the ParsePE func-
tion as decompiled by IDA
known. We will give more details on this example to
illustrate what has been done to fix the code generated
by the decompiler. Some of the constants are going
to be of great help: for instance we can combine both
of them 0xF750F284 XOR 0xF750B7D4 = 0x00004550
= ’PE\0\0’, the text searched is ’PE\0\0’ which is ob-
fuscated with a XOR operation.
At this point we have strong suspicion that this func-
tion is used to parse PE files. A quick dive in Mi-
crosoft’s Visual C++ documentation reveals the struc-
ture PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS which first field is Sig-
nature, whose value is ’PE\0\0’ for Windows binaries.
Thus the variable v4, which is tested against ’PE\0\0’,
might be of type PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS. So we
force this structure and others into IDA’s decompiler
in place of default int type, IDA then finds fields based
on their offsets and updates them in the code. In some
cases the structure is specific to the analyzed binary
(user defined), it is possible to define them manually
in the decompiler plugin.
The beginning of the fixed code is presented on Fig-
ure 2, it is readable by a C developer: one sees that
the function checks whether a file is a PE binary. The
following part of the code will parse it and fill a user
defined structure with some information (entrypoint,
sections...). Besides the compiled binary of this ver-
sion is very similar to the original binary. Doing this
kind of analysis on the whole driver lead us to build an
understandable and consistent version of the driver’s
source code.
3 Functional analysis from the source
code
Now that the source code has been rebuilt, let us
detail how it operates. There are two main phases,
NTSTATUS __cdecl ParsePE (
__out PEDataPtr pPEData ,
__in PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER BaseAddress ,
__in int f l a g ){
PVOID infosPE ;
PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER pDosHeader ;
PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS pNtHeader ;
pNtHeader = (DWORD) infosPE +
infosPE−>e_lfanew ;
i f ( ( pNtHeader−>Signature ^ 0xF750F284 )
!= (IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE ^ 0xF750F284 ) )
return STATUS_WAIT_1;
Figure 2. First 10 lines of the fixed ParsePE
function
the first one consists in setting up the driver: it asks
the operating system for notifications when a binary
is loaded, and initializes stealth mechanisms. The sec-
ond one is triggered when it receives notifications: the
driver infects the target binary by injecting Duqu’s DLL
into services.exe, then activates the payload.
3.1 Initialisation of the driver during boot
Recall that on Windows, the startup order of drivers
is determined by their Group key in the registry. Duqu’s
nfrd965.sys, belonging to the "network" group, is ac-
tivated before the hardware abstraction layer (HAL) is
loaded into memory.
Once started, nfrd965.sys allocates 512 bytes for
storing a pointer array of functions shared by various
callback routines. Then it decrypts some internal pa-
rameters, revealing the name and path of the registry
key used for configuring the injection.
If the decryption succeeded, the driver checks its
execution mode. If it is in debug or fail-safe mode,
the driver halts, otherwise it creates a device named
{624409B3-4CEF-41c0-8B81-7634279A41E5} and de-
fines a list of control commands that the device can
process.
That being done, it registers two callback func-
tions within the kernel’s event handler. The first
is required by the operating system: it is used to
create an access point (\Device\Gpd0) and a link
(\DosDevices\GpdDev) to the driver, and attaches the
device to a memory stack. The second function will be
called when the driver is initialized or reinitialized, it
is inserted in a waiting list of events.
This second function waits until the Windows ker-
nel is totally loaded: it checks if the DLL hal.dll is
loaded, if not, the function is once again inserted into
the events waiting list (for at most 200 times). When
the system is ready, an access point \Device\Gpd1 is
created and linked to a request processing function. At
that point librairies are available for Duqu’s injection.
3.1.1 Stealth techniques
The driver acts like a rootkit because it avoids directly
using suspicious system calls. Indeed those system calls
might be monitored by an antivirus. Typically the
function ZwAllocateVirtualMemory can be used to al-
locate memory space into any process, for instance to
inject code into any target process. Besides, in order
to hook the entrypoint of a system binary, Duqu also
needs the function ZwProtectVirtualMemory that is
deliberately not exported by the kernel. This func-
tion modifies the permissions of a memory block and
can be used to make a code section writable or exe-
cute code in a data section. Duqu was built to find
ZwProtectVirtualMemory’s memory address without
using imports.
The two functions are implemented in the Windows
kernel (in Ntoskrnl.exe or ntkrnlpa.exe, depend-
ing on the version). The driver inspects every module
(DLLs and EXE files) loaded by the OS during boot
until it finds one of the two target kernel files.
Once the file is found, the driver uses the function
ParsePE to examine it closely. It searches, in that ker-
nel file, a call to ZwAllocateVirtualMemory (whose
address is known from the export table) followed by
the opcode push 104h and another (near) call to an
unknown function. If this pattern, shown in Figure 3,
is found, the target address of this last call is consid-
ered to be ZwProtectVirtualMemory. At this point
the memory addresses of both functions are known.
Avoiding hooks. It is firstly checked that the two
functions are located inside the kernel’s memory ad-
dresses and not in user space which would indicate an
obvious hook to a monitored function. Secondly an in-
tegrity mask applying a logical AND is applied on the
first 32 bytes of both functions. The mask is the same
for the two functions and is shown on Figure 4. If the
functions pass both tests, their addresses are consid-
ered valid and are kept for a future stealthy use.
3.1.2 Initialization of shared memory
A shared memory space is allocated and used as a link
between the driver’s callback functions and the kernel.
It is to be filled with, amongst others, infection param-
eters decrypted from the registry and an import table
giving access to kernel32.dll and kernel functions.
(01) PAGE: 004ED1AD loc_4ED1AD : [ . . . ]
(02) PAGE: 004ED1BC 50 push eax ; BaseAddress
(03) PAGE: 004ED1BD 57 push edi ; ProcessHandle
(04) PAGE: 004ED1BE E8 19 8C F1 FF call DS:ZwAllocateVirtualMemory
(05) PAGE: 004ED1C3 3B C3 cmp eax , ebx
(06) PAGE: 004ED1C5 8B 4D FC mov ecx , [ ebp+BaseAddress ]
(07) PAGE: 004ED1C8 89 4E 0C mov [ es i+0Ch] , ecx
(08) PAGE: 004ED1CB 7C 2E j l short loc_4ED1FB
(09) PAGE: 004ED1CD 38 5D 0B cmp byte ptr [ ebp+ProcessHandle +3] , bl
(10) PAGE: 004ED1D0 74 27 jz short loc_4ED1F9
(11) PAGE: 004ED1D2 8B 45 D0 mov eax , [ ebp+var_30 ]
(12) PAGE: 004ED1D5 89 45 F8 mov [ ebp+Prot e c tS i z e ] , eax
(13) PAGE: 004ED1D8 8D 45 F4 lea eax , [ ebp+OldProtect ]
(14) PAGE: 004ED1DB 50 push eax ; OldProtect
(15) PAGE: 004ED1DC 68 04 01 00 00 push 104h
(16) PAGE: 004ED1E1 8D 45 F8 lea eax , [ ebp+Prot e c tS i z e ]
(17) PAGE: 004ED1E4 50 push eax ; Protec tS ize
(18) PAGE: 004ED1E5 8D 45 FC lea eax , [ ebp+BaseAddress ]
(19) PAGE: 004ED1E8 50 push eax ; BaseAddress
(20) PAGE: 004ED1E9 57 push edi ; ProcessHandle
(21) PAGE: 004ED1EA E8 93 96 F1 FF call loc_406882 ; ZwProtectVirtualMemory
(22) PAGE: 004ED1EF 3B C3 cmp eax , ebx
Figure 3. Function calling ZwProtectVirtualMemory.
Figure 4. Integrity mask applied
on ZwAllocateVirtualMemory and
ZwProtectVirtualMemory. Values filled in
gray are those checked.
This import table will be used by both the executable
code that Duqu is going to inject and the payload.
The initialization phase ends by setting up
a notification triggered each time a module is
loaded into memory (through the system call
PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine).
3.2 Code injection
3.2.1 Processing the first notification
Before the injection. The driver is notified each
time a module (DLL or EXE file) is loaded into mem-
ory. Each time, the driver checks if the Windows ver-
sion is supported, then it tries to locate the mapped
module. To do so it uses the process id given as a
parameter by the OS. It reads the file’s base address
from the PEB (Process Environment Block) structure
and compares it to the address passed by the oper-
ating system. It checks that the configuration file is
decrypted in the shared memory and reads the target
file field. As explained by CrySys’ document [4], the
target file in that case is services.exe so from now
on we will focus on that process and the injection into
it.
Payload injection. Duqu’s driver is now going to
inject malicious code into services.exe. Thus the
payload will be executed by services.exe before
services.exe’s legitimate code.
Once services.exe is loaded, the driver de-
termines its entrypoint and allocates memory
(with ZwAllocateVirtualMemory) in the .data
segment. It injects two PE files with altered head-
ers. Then it restores the missing constants (’MZ’,
’IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE’, ’IMAGE_PE_i386_MACHINE,
and ’IMAGE_PE32_MAGIC’) of the first injected code.
Finally it proceeds with the addresses relocation
and modifies the permissions of services.exe’s
entrypoint from RX (PAGE_EXECUTE_READ)
to RWX (PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY) using
ZwProtectVirtualMemory.
Duqu’s nfrd965.sys allocates memory in the
services.exe process, its size is 57 bytes plus the
size of the decrypted DLL. The payload (the DLL
NETP191.PNF) is decrypted and copied there. Next a
handler is opened on the kernel driver (nfrd965.sys),
saved in a shared structure in order to be gathered by
the injected code.
3.2.2 Processing the second notification
The driver is not only notified when the main module
(process services.exe) is loaded, but also when DLLs
linked to that module are loaded. In particular, when
kernel32.dll is loaded, the driver looks for the ad-
dresses of 10 functions exported by kernel32.dll that
will be used by the payload. Trying to be stealthy, the
search consists in comparing the hashed names of 10
functions. This processing ends with saving the first 12
bytes of the entrypoint assembly code of services.exe
and their replacement by a jump on the first injected
(and restored) code. The first instructions of the entry-
point are changed into mov eax,@adresseInjection
followed by call eax.
The process services.exe has been altered and is
now ready to launch the payload.
3.3 Launching the payload
The operating system finishes the initialization of
the services.exe process and proceeds with its exe-
cution by passing control to the code at the entrypoint.
Actually the system starts the first injected code.
Its first task consists in determining its own absolute
memory address (with the instruction sequence call-
pop) because further processing (read, write, jump)
depend on it. During execution the addresses are re-
located with respect to the absolute address of the en-
trypoint.
It then restores the headers of the second injected
code so it is a valid PE and fills, within a shared struc-
ture, an import table from the 10 functions found
in kernel32.dll. Then it creates a handler on
ntdll.dll which is stored in a shared structure. It
then jumps to the entrypoint of the second injected
code.
This additional module adds data from its own PE
header (address of the module, number of sections, ad-
services.exe
data
text
Altered code
Injected PE with restored headers
Decrypted DLL
......
Injected PE with restored headers
01012475    mov  eax,0A18BDh
0101247a    call    eax
Mapped PE + DLL
Figure 5. Memory space injected by Duqu
into services.exe once the injection is done.
dress of the export table) to the shared structure. Fi-
nally these informations are used to map the PE into
memory manually: it allocates memory space, copies
the PE header, maps sections, loads DLLs, creates the
import table, relocates the addresses and finally de-
termines the entrypoint. Then the function relocates
Duqu’s main decrypted DLL, NETP191.PNF, as a DLL
linked to the PE just mapped and calls its entrypoint.
Figure 5 sums up the injections done by Duqu into
services.exe and the system memory.
The payload contained in the DLL is now in
place and executed. Once it is done it sends
a request to the driver through the access point
\Device\{624409B3-4CEF-41c0-8B81-7634279A41E5} so
it restores the 12 first bytes located at the entrypoint
of services.exe. A second request is finally sent to
restore the access permission of services.exe’s entry-
point.
The injection is now done, control is then passed
back to the restored services.exe.
4 Turning the driver
In the previous paragraph we described how the
Duqu’s DLL is injected in services.exe. Some of these
mechanisms, for instance the notifications once a mod-
ule is loaded, can be used for defensive purposes.
In a nutshell the modified driver will calculate sig-
natures (checksums) on binaries upon notification that
they are loaded into memory. On reception of further
notifications, if the checksum has changed, an alert is
risen and further actions might be taken. Let’s now
go into some details of the initialization, memorization
and detection phase of the defensive driver. We’ll end
this paper by a demonstration of the defense granted
by the modified driver against an attack by Duqu.
4.1 Initialization phase
The initialization phase of our driver has been
greatly simplified. We kept the creation of
the access points, removed the search for the
ZwProtectVirtualMemory function. We kept
the handling of notifications when modules are
loaded and also asked for notifications when
the system finishes creating a process (function
PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine).
4.2 Memorization phase
We saw that the alteration is not done when the
first notification is triggered. Thus, if a checksum had
been done at that point, the modification of the entry-
point could be detected when the second notification is
triggered.
We reused Duqu’s checksum function which was orig-
inally called for obfuscating function names.
A first notification is received when a process is cre-
ated. Unfortunately Windows passes only the process
id, its parent and whether it was created or destroyed.
However we can retrieve the PEB (Process Enviroment
Block) structure associated to that process. We used
that information to find the memory address of the
loaded file.
In order to detect Duqu, we focused on
services.exe, we compare the process name to
the string "services.exe". If it is the target process,
we look for its entrypoint, we calculate its hashed
value and store it as an initial signature. The defensive
driver is now ready to detect the hook made by Duqu.
4.3 Detection phase
When a module is loaded, the operating system
passes control to the defensive driver which looks for
the entrypoint of the module. If the loaded module is
a DLL, the entrypoint is searched in the PE file of the
executable file it is linked to. We reused what was done
in Duqu and added the verification of the hash.
The hash of the PE file has been determined and
is to be compared to the original signature previously
stored. If both checksums are different, we infer that
−+∗ Create proce s s 0x914 ∗+−
ProcessImageInformat ion :
PEB=0x7f fd6000 ImageBaseAddress=0x01000000
UniqueProcessId=0x914
Entrypoint bytes at 0x01012475 :
0x6a 0x70 0x68 0xe0 0x15 0x00 0x01 0xe8
ProcessImageName : Desktop\ s e r v i c e s . exe
ProcessImageName : save processID=0x914
CreateProces sNot i fy : ImageBaseAddress=0x01000000
EntryPoint=0x01012475
EntrypointChecksum=0x49af1bf2
Figure 6. From WinDbg: The process
services.exe is loaded. The defensive
driver stores its id (0x914), its entrypoint
(0x01012475) and its hash (0x49af1bf2).
Duqu hooked services.exe between the two notifica-
tions. Since the entrypoint has been altered, the pro-
cess services.exe is flagged as suspicious and submit-
ted to further analysis.
4.4 Proof of concept
Aiming to debug and test the original driver and the
defensive one, we followed the steps described by Sergei
Shevchenko [6] who proposes to rename the Windows
calculator calc.exe as services.exe and launch it to
watch how the drivers react.
For this example we used two virtual machines using
Windows XPSP3 connected by a serial link. The first
machine runs Microsoft’s WinDBG for kernel debug. The
other machine is launched in "kernel debug" mode
which allows the debug machine to communicate on a
kernel level and debug drivers.
While doing tests we uncovered that Duqu’s
nfrd965.sys checks if the system is in debug or fail-
safe mode so we had to patch that out for test purposes,
thus allowing debug. We also configured both drivers
so they can be launched on demand, it was needed to
modify registry keys (the Start parameter has to be
set to 3). This configuration provides us with the pos-
sibility to choose the launch order of both drivers and
services.exe.
We first launched the defensive driver, then Duqu’s
driver and finally services.exe. In the debugger con-
sole, shown on Figure 6, we see when services.exe
is launched. The system notifies the defensive driver
which outputs information about the loaded module
then stores its id, the address of its entrypoint and
its initial signature (checksum of the first bytes at the
entrypoint).
When the notification for kernel32.dll is triggered
to the defensive driver, no modification has been made
∗ Loaded module \WINDOWS\system32\ kerne l32 . d l l ∗
LoadImageNotifyRoutine :
ImageBaseAddress=0x7c800000 Process Id=0x914
−> Ver i fy s e r v i c e s . exe proce s s :
Entrypoint at 0x01012475 :
0x6a 0x70 0x68 0xe0 0x15 0x00 0x01 0xe8
−> OK!
∗ Loaded module \WINDOWS\system32\ s h e l l 3 2 . d l l ∗
LoadImageNotifyRoutine :
ImageBaseAddress=0x7c9d0000 Process Id=0x914
−> Ver i fy s e r v i c e s . exe proce s s :
Entrypoint at 0x01012475 :
0xb8 0xbd 0x18 0x0a 0x00 0 x f f 0xd0 0xe8
−> Checksum e r r o r ! ! ! !
−> Terminating s e r v i c e s . exe
Figure 7. Detection of the altered entrypoint
(0x01012475) of services.exe.
since Duqu’s driver will receive the notification after-
wards (due to the launch order of drivers). So the
checksum succeeds. However there are further notifica-
tions, for instance when the linked DLL shell32.dll
is loaded, the defensive driver checks once again the
entrypoint’s hash and it has been altered. It is shown
on Figure 7. Thus the alteration of services.exe is
detected and the defensive driver takes further steps to
protect the system: it terminates services.exe, end-
ing Duqu’s attempt to compromise the machine.
5 Conclusion
Similarities between Duqu and Stuxnet lead us to
look for a detection method of Duqu when the attack is
going on. We described by and large the infection tech-
nique of Duqu and how its driver operates, stealthy in-
jecting code into services.exe using kernel functions.
Thus we rebuilt a source code for Duqu’s driver and
created a defensive version from this source code. Our
modified driver is able to detect the injection made by
Duqu and protects the system by terminating the in-
fected process services.exe.
Duqu was considered at its times as one of the most
sophisticated malware. And the above shows that, in-
deed, the malware was built with great care. At the
same time, it is known that complex systems may be
fragile. Usually, it is on the defender side that we make
the observation: complex infrastructures offer a lot of
entry points to malware. Here, the argument is op-
posite: it’s the malware which was fragile and we ex-
ploited this feature to turn it for our own purposes.
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